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AN ENDORSEMENT OF DUE PROCESS REFORM
IN PAROLE REVOCATION:
MORRISSEY v. BREWER'
A grant of parole is not mandated by the Constitution, but is a fran-
chise bestowed upon a prisoner by legislative grace.2  Consequently,
parole has been considered a privilege to which no prisoner is entitled
as a matter of right.3 It has been argued that since the parolee has
been deprived of his liberty in accordance with due process of law and
since a state has the uncontrolled discretion to require those convicted
of a crime to serve their entire sentence, then by a premature release of
the parolee, the state has acted ex gratia and has not conferred any le-
gally protected right to remain at liberty.4 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has "rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon
whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a 'right' or as a
'privilege,' " holding rather that they depend upon whether an individual
will be "condemned to suffer grievous loss."'6 In Morrissey v. Brewer,'
the Supreme Court recognized that the revocation of a parolee's qual-
ified liberty is a loss severe enough to warrant constitutional protection
and, for the first time, defined the minimum requirements of due
process in parole revocation proceedings. With the Court's refusal
to decide the issue of right to counsel in such proceedings, however, the
procedural protections mandated may be rendered inefficacious.
1. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
2. Pinana v. State, 76 Nev. 274, 383, 352 P.2d 824, 829 (1960); Zink v. Lear,
28 NJ. Super. 515, 524, 101 A.2d 72, 77 (1953).
3. Silva v. People, 158 Colo. 326, 329, 407 P.2d 38, 39 (1965); Berry v. State Bd.
of Parole, 148 Colo. 547, 548, 367 P.2d 338, 339 (1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 927
(1962).
4. Comment, Parole: A Critique of its Legal Foundations and Conditions, 38
N.Y.U.L. REv. 702, 704 (1963). This theory is commonly referred to as the "Grace
Theory." Id. at 704. A similar conclusion has been reached by applying the "Contract-
Consent Theory" (liberty restored through medium of bargain, with liberty being granted
in consideration of the convicts consent to be bound by conditions) as well as the "Cus-
tody Theory" (parolees are not at liberty but are still in legal custody and thus subject
to prison rules and regulations). Id. at 708, 711-12.
5. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971). See text accompanying notes
87-96 infra.
6. Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
7. 408 U.S. 471.
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The consolidated cases" in Morrissey concerned state parole revoca-
tions based on alleged violations of technical conditions under Iowa's
statutory parole scheme."0 Petitioner Morrissey was released on parole
after serving one year of a maximum seven year sentence for false
drawing of checks. Seven months after his release, he was arrested at
the direction of his parole officer and incarcerated in a local jail. His
parole officer recommended revocation in a written report which speci-
fied the parole violations: (1) purchase of a car under an assumed
name and operating it without permission; (2) giving false statements
to police and an insurance company concerning his address after a
minor accident; (3) obtaining credit under an assumed name; and (4)
failing to report his place of residence to his parole officer. Further,
the report provided that Morrissey had admitted to these alleged viola-
tions in an interview with the parole officer." After considering this
report and without providing Morrissey with a hearing, the Iowa Board
of Parole revoked his parole and directed his return to the state peni-
tentiary located some 100 miles from the place of arrest.'2
Similarly, petitioner Booher was granted parole after serving two
years of a maximum ten year sentence for forgery. Approximately
nine months later, his parole officer directed that he be arrested for vio-
lating the territorial restrictions of his parole, obtaining a driver's li-
cense under an assumed name, and failing to maintain gainful employ-
8. Id. See-text accompanying notes 11-14 infra.
9. Parole conditions are classified as technical or criminal. Technical conditions
are behavior requirements limiting freedoms normally enjoyed by the average citizen.
Criminal conditions originate by statute. Comment, Parole: A Critique of its Legal
Foundations and Conditions, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 702, 720-21 (1963). "LT]he majority of
parole revocations are for technical violations." Note, Parole Revocation in the Fed-
eral System, 56 GEo. LAW J. 705, 708 n.33 (1968) (citation omitted).
10. IowA CODE ANN. §§ 247.1-247.33 (1969). The Iowa Statute merely estab-
lished a parole system and does not define any specific procedure for parole revocation.
The board of parole was empowered to
terminate or discharge a parole granted by it . . . at any time and at its sole dis-
cretion whenever it is satisfied that satisfactory evidence has been given that society
will not suffer thereby. Id. § 247.5.
Further, the duration of the parole period was considered to be within the sole discretion
of the board of parole and could be terminated at any time. Op. IowA ATmY. GEN.
[Bobzin], March 26, 1970.
Consequently, with this absence of specific statutory guidelines for parole revocation,
summary revocation was allowable. The absence of procedures guaranteeing notice
and a hearing was not previously considered to be a denial of due process. Curtis v.
Bennett, 256 L 1164, 1167, 131 N.W.2d 1, 3 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 958 (1965).
11. 408 U.S. at 473. Although admitting that he had failed to contact his parole
officer, Morrissey attempted to excuse this on the basis that he had been sick. Id.
12. Id. at 472-73.
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ment. While incarcerated in a jail located near the place of his arrest,
Booher allegedly admitted to violating these parole conditions at an in-
terview with his parole officer. 3 The parole officer recommended
revocation of Booher's parole in a report to the Iowa Board of Parole
which described the alleged violations and Booher's admissions. With-
out affording Booher an opportunity to explain or refute these allega-
tions, the Board ordered revocation, causing Booher to be recommitted
to the state penitentiary which was located some 250 miles from the
place of arrest. 4
After exhausting state remedies,' 5 the petitioners filed separate fed-
eral habeas corpus petitions alleging that they had been denied due
process of law because their paroles had been revoked without hear-
ings.'8 The district court, however, held that the failure to accord
a hearing prior to parole revocation did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.l1 The cases were consolidated
on appeal and, in a 4-3 decision, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, while recognizing that the traditional view of parole as a privi-
lege rather than a vested right was no longer dispositive,' 8 nevertheless
concluded that a balancing of the competing interests' 9 involved in-
dicated that no hearing was necessary.20
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger,2' re-
versed the decision of the court of appeals and held that, although a
13. Id. at 474. Booher attempted to excuse his failure to maintain employment and
his violation of the territorial restrictions by claiming that
he could not find work that would pay him what he wanted-he stated he would
not work for $2.25 to $2.75 per hour-and that he had left the area to get work
in another city. Id.
14. Id. at 473.
15. Id. at 474.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 443 F.2d 942, 946-47 (8th Cir. 1971).
19. The competing interests considered by the court were the need to protect the
welfare and security of society, and the desirability of placing convicted persons on
parole in order to promote rehabilitation. The court concluded that prison officials
are vested with wide discretion in controlling persons committed to them and since
prisoners have no statutory right to be granted parole nor to be allowed to remain on
parole once granted, the importance which the individual parolee attaches to his condi-
tional liberty is not sufficient to override the interest of the state and prison authori-
ties in effectively managing internal disciplinary and custodial affairs. Id. at 948-50.
It should be noted, however, that the court specifically stated that while prison of-
ficials have broad discretion and a parolee has no constitutional right to a hearing,
"the parolee cannot be made the subject of arbitrary action." Id. at 490.
20. Id. at 952.
21. Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist joined with the Chief
Justice in the majority opinion. 408 U.S. at 472.
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parolee's liberty is indeterminate, it is valuable and is therefore
within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause.22 The majority recognized two distinct stages of the parole
revocation process at which procedural protections are required. 23 Ini-
tially, a hearing is required after arrest to determine whether there is prob-
able cause or reasonable grounds to believe that the parolee has violated
his parole.24 Once probable cause is established, a revocation hearing
must be held prior to revocation and within a reasonable time after the
parolee is taken into custody.25 In addition, the Court defined what it
considered to be the minimum requirements of due process at both
hearings.25
The majority's refusal to decide whether the parolee is entitled to
the assistance of retained or appointed counsel prompted Justice
Brennan's concurring opinion, in which Justice Marshall joined. 27
Justice Brennan felt that precedent required that a parolee at least "be al-
lowed to retain an attorney if he so desires"28 and that the only question
which should have been left unanswered was whether indigents should be
furnished counsel. 29 Justice Douglas also disagreed with the majority's
abstention on this issue and, in his dissenting opinion,30 he concluded
that both retained counsel and appointed counsel should be included as
constitutional requirements .3  Additionally, Justice Douglas expressed
disagreement as to when the initial hearing should take place. He be-
lieved that a hearing should be afforded prior to and not subsequent to
an arrest for a violation of a technical parole condition -.32
The Court was initially confronted with the state's assertion that a
sufficient hearing had in fact been provided since, as a general matter of
practice, the Board of Parole had granted both Morrissey and Booher
a hearing within two months after the respective revocations of parole, 88
had reviewed the parole officer's report concerning the alleged parole
violations in the presence of the returned parolee, and had provided the
22. Id. at 482.
23. Id. at 485-88.
24. Id. at 485, citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-71 (1970).
25. 408 U.S. at 487-89.
26. See text accompanying notes 148-55 infra.
27. 408 U.S. at 490. See text accompanying notes 187-89 infra.
28. 408 U.S. at 491, quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970).
29. 408 U.S. at 491.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 498. See text accompanying notes 220-29 infra.
32. 408 U.S. at 497-98. See text accompanying notes 156-59 infra.
33. Id. at 475-76.
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parolee with an opportunity to orally contest or explain the allegations. 4
The state argued that neither Morrissey nor Booher had denied the alle-
gations at the hearing. 5 The state further contended that, if either had
denied the report, the Board would have conducted a further investiga-
tion before finalizing, modifying or reversing the original decision. 6
The Court refused to consider the state's argument since it had not
been raised and preserved in the courts below.3 7 Nevertheless, the Court
implicitly denounced the state's procedure by its continued insistence that
due process requires a hearing prior to the effective decision to revoke
parole.
3 8
THE FUNCTION OF PAROLE
Examining the function of parole in the correctional process, the
Court concluded that both the individual's interest in not having his
liberty unjustifiably terminated and the state's interest in adminis-
tering a parole system consistent with its rehabilitative goal demand some
procedural safeguards upon revocation.3 9
The parole system in this country is a creation of both federal and
state41 statutes. The language of such statutes, however, does not pro-
vide a definite indication as to the purpose parole is to serve in the
penological system. Generally, the theories underlying penology have
been labeled as deterrence, restraint, retribution, and rehabilitation. 2
34. Id.
35. id. at 476.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 476-77. See United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 72-73 (1971); Ladner
v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 172-73 (1958); Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339,
362 n.16 (1958); cf. United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395,
412 (1947).
38. See 408 U.S. at 476 n.1. Ostensibly, the Court conceded the state an oppor-
tunity to assert this claim upon remand of the case to the District Court:
[The State] may make a showing in the District Court that petitioners in fact have
admitted the violations charged before a neutral officer. Id. at 477 (emphasis
added).
However, it is apparent in the requirement that a hearing be provided before revoca-
tion that the state's argument will fail. Further, the Court appeared to acquiesce in
the petitioner's argument that a hearing provided after the parolee was returned to
prison could not result in an objective evaluation. Id. at 476 n.1.
Moreover, even if the state asserts the parolee's admissions as a basis for summary
revocation, these admissions were made in interviews with the parolee's supervising
officer (Id. at 473-74) and not to the neutral officers required by the Court. Id. at
486.
39. Id. at 483-84.
40. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-10 (1970).
41. E.g., IowA CODE ANN. §§ 247.1-247.33 (1969).
42. See W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, JR., CasmNAL LAw 22-24 (1972). The theories of
prevention and education are also mentioned but their similarity to deterrence makes
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Parole is not relevant to the first three theories because the granting of
even a conditional liberty will neither deter future crimes, restrain
parolees from committing further crimes, nor satiate a desire for revenge
in the parolee's victims. The purpose of parole, therefore, if it is to be
consistent with the penological system of which it is a part, must be
rehabilitative.
In Morrissey, Chief Justice Burger recognized that the purpose of
parole is to help the individual reintegrate into society as a constructive
individual.43 Justice Douglas also recognized the rehabilitory purpose
of parole. He stated that, under the modem concept of penology, pa-
role is part of the rehabilitative aim of the correctional philosophy di-
rected at returning a prisoner to a full family and community life.44
The general rule is that parole may be granted upon such terms
and conditions as the granting power may see fit.45  Chief Justice Bur-
ger viewed such conditions as serving a dual purpose." They prohibit
the parolee from engaging in behavior antipathetic to his rehabilita-
tion.47 In addition, the condition requiring periodic meetings with the
parole officer provides that officer with valuable information with
which to advise and guide the parolee into constructive development."8
The parole officer ostensibily serves in an advisory position to the
mention of them of no significant importance. Prevention is a theory aimed at de-
terring the criminal himself rather than deterring others from committing further
crimes. The validity of this theory has been questioned because of the high recidivism
rates of those punished. Id. at 22. Education is a theory based on the idea that the
publicity which attends the trial, conviction and punishment will educate the public
as to the distinctions between good and bad conduct, which, "when known, most of
society will observe." Id. at 23. Deterrence is based on the idea that "the sufferings
of the criminal for the crime he has committed are supposed to deter others from com-
mitting future crimes, lest they suffer the same fate." Id. Since education is an im-
portant part of deterrence (the public must be educated of the criminal's fate if it is
to deter) and since deterrence is an important aspect of prevention, combining the
three seems appropriate.
43. 408 U.S. at 477-78.
44. Id. at 495. See Note, Parole Revocation in the Federal System, 56 GEo. L.J.
705 (1968); Comment, Parole: A Critique of its Legal Foundations and Conditions, 38
N.Y.U.L. Rav. 702 (1963); Comment, Freedom and Rehabilitation in Parole Revoca-
tion Hearings, 72 YALE L.J. 368 (1962).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1970); CAL. PEN. CODE § 3053 (West 1970); IowA CODE
ANN. § 247.6 (1969). It has been suggested, however, that "[t]he rules must
be reasonable, practical, and within the intent of the law, and they should not require
behavior that is illegal, immoral, or impossible." Arluke, A Summary of Parole
Rules-Thirteen Years Later, 15 CRIME & DELiNQ. 267, 268 (1969).
46. 408 U.S. at 478, citing Note, Observations on the Administration of Parole, 79
YALE L.J. 698, 699-700 (1970).
47. 408 U.S. at 478.
48. Id.
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parolee and he ordinarily will not take steps to revoke parole unless
he feels that serious and continuing violations indicate that the parolee
is not adjusting properly.49 Notwithstanding this supposed reluctance
to initiate revocation proceedings, Chief Justice Burger noted that
revocation is not unusual5" since an estimated 36 to 45% of all parolees
are subjected to revocation and are returned to prison. 51
In general, parole conditions are exceedingly broad, so that most
parolees are unable to avoid violating at least one of them during the
parole period.52  "If the appropriate officials had knowledge of all the
parole violations that occur, virtually every parole could be revoked at
one time or another."'53 However, many conditions are not intended to
be enforced.54  They are vague statements of behavior rather than spe-
cific rules to be followed and they are designed to demonstrate to the pa-
rolee what his ultimate personal goals should be.55
49. Id. at 479.
50. Id.
51. Id., citing PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 62 (1967) (hereinafter cited as PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION).
52. R. DAWSON, SENTENCING: THE DECISION AS TO TYPE, LENGTH, AND CONDITIONS
OF SENTENCE 306 (1969) (hereinafter cited as DAwsON).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 306-07.
55. Id. at 307. Although parole conditions theoretically are designed to aid in
rehabilitation, statutory concern with the protection of society seems to have resulted
in vague and confusing conditions. For example, the federal statute provides for re-
lease of prisoners on parole only when such release is not "incompatible with the
welfare of society." 18 U.S.C. § 4203(A). A proper release under the statute pre-
supposes the imposition of any conditions necessary to ensure the safety and welfare of
society. It would seem that the conditions ought to bear a reasonable relation not only
to the community's protection but also to the success of the parolee's rehabilitation as
well. Note, Parole Revocation in the Federal System, 56 GEo. L.J 705, 708 (1968);
see Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1963). Consequently, the conditions
should be realistic and flexible with each case being judged separately, taking into ac-
count the needs, problems, and capacity of the individual offender. Arluke, A Summary
of Parole Rules-Thirteen Years Later, 15 CRIME & DELNQ. 267, 269 (1969).
Instead, a study of parole rules resulted in the general conclusion that in many
states the conditions were too numerous to be of any real value, that some of the
statements listed as conditions were actually interpretations of policy, that many of
the regulations were unrealistic and unenforceable, and that the basic rules were not
uniform throughout the states. Id. at 267.
Although some states have decreased the number of conditions, notably California,
Colorado, Mississippi and Missouri (Id. at 268), many more have increased the number.
Id. To be effective they must be simplified and standardized, and they should be
regarded as aids to successful adjustment rather than as punitive restrictions. Id.
at 268-69; see C. NEWMAN, SoUrCEBOOK ON PROBATION, PAROLE AN PARDONS 344-49
(3d ed. 1970), for a listing of general parole conditions and the states in which they
are imposed.
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In his dissent, Justice Douglas was more critical of the conditions
attached under the parole system than was the Chief Justice. He recog-
nized that parole boards have had broad discretion in formulating con-
ditions and that conditions have been drawn "to cover any contingency
that might occur" in order to maximize "control over the parolee by
his parole officer."' 6  The result, he concluded, was "often vague and
moralistic . .. parole conditions [which] may seem oppressive and un-
fair to the parolee. ' 7  Justice Douglas, while acknowledging that a
parole officer's exercise of discretion often results in counseling rather
than revocation, expressed concern that parole is commonly revoked on
mere suspicion that the parolee may have committed a crime. 5  "Viola-
tions of conditions of parole may be technical, they may be done unknow-
ingly, they may be fleeting and of no consequence," 9 and thus if the pur-
pose of parole is to be maximized the parolee should be given a chance to
explain before he is subjected to further incarceration.10
Chief Justice Burger alluded to an incidental function of parole
when he stated "[iut also serves to alleviate the costs to society of
keeping an individual in prison.""' Instead of characterizing the finan-
cial benefit to society as an incidental purpose, however, the financial
consideration should be viewed as a necessity. The volume of prison
traffic alone makes it economically infeasible not to release convicts on
parole."2 This necessity would be advanced by establishing and utilizing
56. 408 U.S. at 496, quoting DAWSON, supra note 52, at 307.
57. 408 U.S. at 496, quoting DAWSON, supra note 52, at 306.
58. 408 U.S. at 496, quoting DAWSON, supra note 52, at 366-67. Although Daw-
son states: "No instances were observed in which a parolee was returned as a
violator solely because of suspected criminal activities that could not be proved," Id.
at 366, Justice Douglas' concern must be directed at Dawson's subsequent statement:
"There were cases observed in which this, along with other factors, resulted in revo-
cation without conviction of suspected offense." Id. The example of other factors
mentioned was an alcoholic sex deviate who begins drinking again. Id. In such a
case, however, if drinking is one of the conditions attached, parole could be revoked
for that violation alone. Notwithstanding this argument, Dawson indicates that such
revocations are not frequent. Id. at 366-67. Significantly, however, Dawson cites as
his authority "high-ranking parole officials" andi thus it is apparent that Justice
Douglas views revocation on mere suspicion as a serious problem in spite of the parole
officials' statements minimizing its severity.
59. 408 U.S. at 495.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 477; see ANNuAL REPORT, Omo ADuLT PAROLE AuromTy 1964/65;
Warren, Probation in the Federal System of Criminal Justice, 19 FED. PRoB. 3 (Sept.
1955); Comment, Parole: A Critique of Its Legal Foundations & Conditions, 38 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 702, 705-07 (1963).
62. Comment, Parole: A Critique of Its Legal Foundations & Conditions, 38 N.Y.U.L.
Rv. 702, 705, 708 (1963). This conclusion is drawn in reference to the Grace
Theory. Id. For a discussion of the Grace Theory see note 4 supra.
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a more effective and workable parole system based on specific and
simple conditions.
Chief Justice Burger insisted that an accurate determination of
whether a parole violation has occurred is essential to the success of a
parole system:
Implicit in the system's concern with parole violations is the notion that
the parolee is entitled to retain his liberty as he substantially abides by
the conditions of his parole.6 3
The bifurcated nature of this process should involve an inherent con-
cession to the discretion of the administrative authority, for while
the first step in a revocation decision . . . involves a wholly retrospec-
tive factual question: whether the parolee has in fact acted in violation
of one or more conditions of his parole. . . [t]he second question
[whether parole should be revoked] involves the application of expertise
by the parole authority in making a prediction as to the ability of the
individual to live in society without committing antisocial acts.64
Notwithstanding the predictive and discretionary character of this sec-
ond step, Chief Justice Burger concluded "it is important for the board
to know not only that some violation was committed but also to know
accurately how many and how serious the violations were."65  Thus,
the Chief Justice asserted that some form of procedural safeguards
is necessary to ensure that the discretion exercised is an informed
discretion.6
Tim DEMANDS OF DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
The demands of due process in criminal prosecutions are explicitly
treated in the United States Constitution. The Fifth Amendment es-
tablished that no one shall, "in any criminal case," be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law.67  The Sixth Amend-
ment defined the minimum requirements of due process in criminal
prosecutions by providing that:
[T]he accused shall enjoy the rights to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury .. .to be informed of the nature and cause of the accu-
sation; to be confronted with witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence.68
63. 408 U.S. at 479.
64. Id. at 479-80.
65. Id. at 480.
66. Id. at 484.
67. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
68. Id. amend. VI. Although the Sixth Amendment only applies to the federal
government, the majority of the requirements mentioned have also been held ap-
1973]
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These are the requirements which Chief Justice Burger wished to
avoid by beginning his consideration of the demands of due process
with "the proposition that the revocation of parole is not part of a
criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant
in such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocations."' 0
The exclusion of parole revocation proceedings from criminal prose-
cutions should be based on the validity of the factual distinctions between
them. In Mempa v. Rhay,71 the Court held that the time of sentencing is
a critical stage in a criminal case and thus the revocation of probation
and the imposition of a deferred sentence require compliance with proce-
dural due process." The distinction drawn between a probationer who
has been tried and convicted and a parolee who has been tried, convicted
and sentenced, however, is difficult to justify.
Generally, it is argued that "probation relates to action taken before
the prison door is closed. . . while parole relates to action taken after
the door has been closed ' 72 and with this symbolic shutting of the
prison door the constitutional protections required in criminal cases
are relinquished. However, "[p]robation, like parole, 'is intended to be
a means of restoring offenders who are good social risks to society; to
afford the unfortunate another opportunity by clemency.' "73 The ob-
jective of probation, therefore, is educational and reconstructive rather
than punitive or oppressive74 and thus it is concerned with rehabilitation
plicable to the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (jury trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14
(1967) (compulsory process); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S 213 (1967)
(speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation of witnesses);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (assistance of counsel). The only
two requirements mentioned in the Sixth Amendment which have not been held
applicable to the states are the right to a public trial and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; however, it might be noted that they have not
been specifically excluded as no case has dealt with them directly.
It might also be noted that additional requirements which are mentioned in the Fifth
Amendment have also been held applicable to the states. See Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)
(privilege against self-incrimination). The right to a grand jury indictment, however,
has been specifically denied applicability to the states. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516 (1884).
69. 408 U.S. at 480; cf. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967). See text accom-
panying notes 70-86, 227 infra.
70. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
71. Id. at 133-37.
72. Ex parte Anderson, 191 Ore. 409, 424, 229 P.2d 633, 639-40 (1951), quoting
Lovelace v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 326, 147 S.W.2d 1029, 1033 (1941).
73. Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432, 435 (1943), quoting Zerbst v. Kidwell,
304 U.S. 359, 363 (1938).
74. Logan v. People, 138 Colo. 304, 307, 332 P.2d 897, 899 (1958).
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rather than with the determination of guilt7- It is clear, therefore, that
both probation and parole
'now share precisely the same goals and use precisely the same tech-
niques'. .... Both devices pursue the goals of rehabilitation, sur-
veillance, and economy; both assist the agencies of law enforcement,
prosecution, and institutional confinement; conditions are attached to
the grant of either; the community serves as the correctional arena in
both; and the individual is in each case under the supervision of some-
one who has access to coercive authority.76
In short, stripped of legal verbiage, the factual distinction 77 between a
probationer and a parolee is negligible and the denomination of proba-
tion as part of the criminal prosecution while excluding parole from
that designation appears inconsistent.
A major argument against comparable treatment of probation and
parole is that the judicial power of a court which awards and revokes
probation and pronounces sentence is clearly distinguishable from the
power of an authorized administrative body to grant or revoke parole. 78
When a court suspends the pronouncement of sentence, the argument
75. Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 213 (1937).
76. Cohen, Due Process, Equal Protection and State Parole Revocation Proceedings,
42 U. COLo. L. REv. 197, 225 (1970); see note 236 infra.
77. "The only factual distinction between a parolee and a probationer is that the
parolee has served part of his sentence in the penitentiary prior to receiving his con-
ditional release, whereas the probationer obtains his conditional freedom without prior
incarceration." Id. at 226.
This factual distinction is evident in both state and federal statutes. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3651 (1970) (probation) and 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1970) (parole); CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 1203 (West Supp. 1972) (probation) and CAL. PEN. CODE § 3041 (West Supp.
1972) (parole); IowA CODE ANN. § 247.20 (1969) (probation) and IowA CODE ANN.
§ 247.5 (1969) (parole).
It should be noted that both California and Iowa have indeterminant sentencing
(CAL. PEN. CODE § 3020 (West Supp. 1972); IoWA CODE ANN. § 789.13 (1969)) which
means that the judge does not set the sentence as a specified number of years but the
limits are set by law, and the actual term is left to the Adult Authority (California) or
the Director of Corrections (Iowa). Id. After sentence has been set, parole can be
granted prior to the completion of the term set.
Under a system such as this, it can hardly be said that parole revocation does not
affect sentencing because once parole is revoked the sentence can be reset at the
maximum:
Parole revocation hearings in California, particularly, cannot be differentiated from
the probation revocation hearing considered in Mempa v. Rhay, because Cal-
ifornia's parole revocation hearings directly affect the parolee's sentence. When
the Adult Authority revokes parole, the parolee's sentence is invariably reset at the
maximum allowed by law, subject to a later redetermination. Van Dyke, Parole
Revocation Hearings in California: The Right to Counsel, 59 CAL. L. REv.
1215, 1243 (1971), citing Adult Authority Resolution 171, adopted March 6,
1951.
See Lincoln v. California Adult Authority, 435 F.2d 133, 134 (9th Cir. 1970).
78. Ex parte Anderson, 191 Ore. 409, 424, 229 P.2d 633, 640 (1951).
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goes, the judicial process has not been completed, but remains in a state
of suspension.79 Not so, however, in the case of a prisoner who has been
sentenced and imprisoned. 80 The infirmity in this argument stems
from the use of the word "power." The power of the court is dis-
tinguishable from the power of an administrative agency only in that
it is part of the judicial system."' The effect of each decision is the
same in that both may result in the incarceration of the individual.
A distinction based on pre-sentence and post-sentence action is untenable
because it in no way affects the power of the decision-making body and is
merely a characterization utilized to grant protections in one case and not
in the other.
The argument that the powers are distinguishable is untenable in
another sense. The jurisdiction of lower courts and the powers of ad-
ministrative agencies such as parole boards depend upon statutory
authorization.
The power to grant paroles is not inherent in courts; Pennsylvania
courts never had such power until it was given to them by [statute]
. . . and then only with respect to prisoners in county jails and work-
houses. What the legislature thus gave it can take away again in whole
or in part and vest in some other agency of the government. 82
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. One kind of power of adjudication which clearly cannot be conferred upon
an administrative agency is the power to determine guilt or innocence in criminal
cases. The reason is that the criminal defendant is entitled to special procedural
protection of the kind that is given neither in civil proceedings in court nor in
administrative proceedings .... The problem is therefore to distinguish between
criminal penalties and civil or remedial penalties, for the administrative imposition
of penalties is commonplace . . . . 1 K. DAvis, ADMImSTRATwE LAW § 2.13, at
133-34 (1958).
The distinction expounded by Davis is the same as that used in reference to pro-
bation and parole in Ex parte Anderson, 191 Ore. 409, 229 P.2d 633 (1951). The
argument is that probation is part of the judicial process of a criminal prosecution
because it involves sentencing. As such, it is subject to special procedural protections
through the Sixth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment as applied to the states by way
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Parole, on the other hand, is not part of the judicial
process subject to these special procedural protections because when parole is granted the
judicial process has already been completed. Consequently, the power of the court to
grant and revoke probation is a judicial power which cannot be delegated to an ad-
ministrative agency, whereas the power of the parole board is merely an administra-
tive power.
In actuality, neither procedure involves the guilt determination for an original offense,
but both involve the guilt determination of a subsequent violation of a condition. Upon
a determination of guilt in regard to such a violation, both the court and the board
have the power to incarcerate the alleged violator.
82. Ex parte Anderson, 191 Ore. 409, 229 P.2d 633, 640 (1951), quoting Common-
wealth ex rel. Banks v. Cain, 345 Pa. 581, 28 A.2d 897, 899 (1942).
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It is thus clear that if the legislature so desired, as in Pennsylvania, the
power to revoke and grant parole could be granted to the court system.
By distinguishing between the powers of the court and the powers of
administrative agencies, and by relying on this distinction as a criteria
for what is included within a criminal prosecution, the judiciary
has allowed the legislature to determine which status requires constitu-
tional protection and which does not. If a mere statutory change would
include parole within the realm of criminal prosecutions, such a dis-
tinction is tenuous. Constitutional protections are not creatures of
statute but are inherent in the constitutional provisions themselves.
The state of New York has pioneered the rejection of the distinction
between parole and probation. In People ex rel. Combs v. LaVallee8s
the petitioner challenged his parole revocation, alleging his right to due
process under the state constitution and, more specifically, his right to
be represented by counsel had been violated by the revocation pro-
cedure. The court recognized that certain distinctions between pro-
bation and parole do exist since the court imposed sentence of a
parolee cannot be changed and since parole proceedings are argua-
bly not part of the criminal processA4  It stated, however, that it did
not consider these differences to be so vital as to allow them to direct the
application or denial of constitutional protections.8 5 The court con-
cluded that:
When all the legal niceties are laid aside a proceeding to revoke
parole involves the right of an individual to continue at liberty or to be
imprisoned. It involves a deprivation of liberty just as much as did the
original criminal action and. . . falls within the due process provision
• . . of our State constitution.86
83. 29 App. Div. 2d 128, 286 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1968).
84. Id. at 131, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
85. Id.
86. Id. N.Y. CONsT. art. 1, § 6 provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime
unless on indictment of a grand jury, and in any trial in any court whatever
the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel
as in civil actiony and shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
and be confronted with the witnesses against him. No person shall be subject to
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense; nor shall he be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself .... Id. (emphasis added).
While the same guarantees defined in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United
States Constitution are present, it should be noted that no distinction is made between
criminal prosecutions and civil cases as in the United States Constitution. The distinc-
tions discounted in LaVallee (see text accompanying note 83 supra), therefore, were not
concerned with the question whether parole was part of a criminal proceeding, but
whether parole was a judicial proceeding. Within the meaning of this section guaran-
teeing safeguards "in any trial in any court," the parole board was not considered a
1973]
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THE TEST FOR APPLICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
By denying application of the Sixth Amendment to parole revoca-
tion proceedings, the Court necessarily became dependent on the nebu-
lous dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to in-
ject procedural protections into the parole revocation process. Conse-
quently, the Court was obligated to decide whether the denial of lib-
erty inherent in parole revocation invokes the procedural protections of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Until recently, this question had been resolved by a determination of
whether the "governmental benefit is characterized as a 'right or as a
privilege'."' Commonly denominated the "right-privilege" distinction, "8
this doctrine has been utilized to deny application of constitutional pro-
tections to the termination of a governmental benefit where the individ-
ual's access to that benefit is characterized as a privilege rather than a
right.8" More specifically, the theory as applied to the relationship of the
parolee to the state's grant of parole is that parole is conferred "not as
a matter of right, but as a matter of grace and privilege to enable the
prisoner to prove himself. . . ,,,o The government is not required to
prematurely release any legally convicted prisoner. If a prisoner is
in fact given the privilege of conditional liberty, that liberty may be
terminated at any time under the terms and established practices of the
granting authority. 91 Such an interpretation of the right-privilege dis-
court. People ex. rel. Johnson v. Follette, 58 Misc. 2d 474, 480, 295 N.Y.S.2d 565,
572 (1968). However, probation revocation was controlled by the courts and these
constitutional safeguards were apposite. It was this difference which the LaVallee
court found not so compelling as to deny constitutional protection to parole hearings.
87. 408 U.S. at 481, quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971).
88. The right-privilege distinction in constitutional law first appeared in the case
of McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). In that
case, a policeman challenged his dismissal for participating in political activities argu-
ing that his right to participate was guaranteed by the United States Constitution. id. at
220, 29 N.E. at 517-18. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Massachusetts Supreme Court,
replied to this challenge by declaring, "[tihe petitioner may have a constitutional right to
talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman" Id. at 220, 29
N.E. at 517.
89. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HAiv. L. REv. 1439 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne].
This tough-minded distinction between constitutionally protected rights of pri-
vate citizens and unprotected governmental privileges has been applied to defeat
a great variety of claims associated with government employment or other forms
of largess. Id. at 1440.
Van Alstyne's use of government "largess" refers to a particular status which is de-
pendent upon government expenditures (i.e. the status of a welfare recipient or a
parolee) and which does not have any constitutional basis. Id. at 1442 n.11.
90. Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 1074, 1099 (1953).
91. Id,
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tinction has consistently been applied to deny parolees the right to
notice and hearing before revocation.92
Militating against the harsh consequences of this doctrine, judicial
circumvention became so prevalent9" that the Court finalized the de-
mise of the doctrine in Graham v. Richardson.94  In Graham, Justice
Blackmun, writing for the Court, concluded "this Court now has re-
jected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a
governmental benefit is characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege.' 95
Although concerned with an individual's access to welfare benefits,
Graham was not expressly limited to its facts and has been applied to
all constitutional challenges involving "governmental benefits." ' 6
In Morrissey, both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Douglas relied
on Graham to discount the right-privilege distinction. 97  Moreover, re-
lying on Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Committee v. McGrathY the Chief
Justice asserted:
Whether any procedural protections are due depends on the extent to
which an individual will be "condemned to suffer grievous loss."99
In McGrath, the Court was confronted with the problem of whether due
process required notice and hearing to be provided to suspect organiza-
tions before the Attorney General could designate them as "communist
92. E.g., Ex parte Tabor, 173 Kan. 686, 250 P.2d 793 (1952); Ex parte Damato,
Il N.J. Super. 576, 78 A.2d 734 (1951).
93. Van Alstyne, supra note 89, at 1445. For a discussion of these methods of cir-
cumvention and their limitations see id. at 1445-64.
94. 403 U.S. 365 (1971). In Graham, Arizona and Pennsylvania statutes which
denied welfare benefits to resident aliens or to aliens who had not lived in the U.S.
for a certain length of time were challenged as violating the Equal Protection Clause.
The argument was advanced that there is a special public-interest doctrine by which
states desire to preserve limited welfare benefits for its own citizens. This was dis-
counted in Graham because the doctrine was heavily grounded on the theory that
privileges, as opposed to rights, may be made dependent upon citizenship and the
Court had rejected the right-privilege distinction. Id. at 374. See also Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404
(1963).
95. 403 U.S. at 374.
96. See Dougall v. Sugarman, 339 F. Supp. 906, 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (holding un-
constitutional a New York Civil Service Law restricting civil service employment to
United States citizens); cf. Teitscheid v. Leopold, 342 F. Supp. 299, 302 (S.D. Vt.
1972) (denial of employment to aliens under Vermont statute denies them equal pro-
tection of the law); Younus v. Shabat, 336 F. Supp. 1137, 1139 (N.D. ]11. 1971)
(eligibility for tenured status in state college system).
97. 408 U.S. at 481, 493.
98. 341 U.S. 124-26 (1951).
99. 408 U.S. at 481 (emphasis added).
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organizations" in a list to be forwarded to the Loyalty Review Board. 100
Several members of the Court concluded that notice and hearing were
required and, in his concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter propounded:
[T]he right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss
of any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships
of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society. 1 1
Significantly, Frankfurter had assumed that the governmental action in-
volved resulted in a deprivation of "liberty" within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 1°2 Therefore, his statement was not di-
rected to the question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment applied,
but was rather concerned with the procedure due under the circum-
stances. In Goldberg v. Kelly'03 the Court again directed the "griev-
ous loss" standard solely to the issue of what procedure was due. In
Goldberg, it was conceded by the government that the Fourteenth
Amendment was applicable to the termination of welfare payments,1
0 4
but the Court went on to state:
The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the re-
cipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be "condemned to
suffer grievous loss"... .105
In contrast, the Morrissey Court's concern with whether the individ-
ual would suffer a "grievous loss" was primarily directed to the pre-
liminary issue of whether the Fourteenth Amendment safeguards applied
at all, and not to the nature of the process required. 10 6 In considering
whether the infringement of any given interest should require the appli-
cation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court noted:
The question is not merely the "weight" of the individual's interest, but
whether the nature of the interest is one within the contemplation of the
"liberty or property" language of the Fourteenth Amendment. 07
The Court based this reasoning on its recent decision in Fuentes v.
Shevin, 08 wherein it had held state laws allowing prejudgment replevin
without notice or hearing to be violative of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Fuentes Court had examined the nature of the individual's
100. 341 U.S. at 143, 173, 176, 186, 202.
101. Id. at 168 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 162.
103. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
104. Id. at 261-62.
105. Id. at 262-63 (emphasis added).
106. 408 U.S. at 481. The Court stated, "[wihether any procedural protections are
due depends on the extent to which an individual will be "condemned to suffer grievous
loss." Id. (emphasis added).
107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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interest and concluded that it was encompassed within the "property"
language of the Fourteenth Amendment: 10 9
The right to a prior hearing, of course, attaches only to the deprivation
of an interest encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's pro-
tection. . . . [I]t is clear that the appellants were deprived of pos-
sessory interests in . . .chattels that were within the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment."10
Decisions prior to Fuentes in which the Court had condemned the tak-
ing of "significant" property interests without notice and hearing had
given only cursory consideration to whether the interests involved were
encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment protection."' Perhaps
Fuentes intended to stress that, where the asserted interests enjoy only
an attenuated relationship to the "liberty or property" language of the
amendment, the Court will not encroach into an area of legislative pre-
rogative." 2 Significantly, the Fuentes Court recognized that it was not
the weight but rather the nature of the interest that was the basis for
application of the Due Process Clause."13
The Morrissey Court evidenced a similar circumspection:
To say that the concept of due process is flexible does not mean that
judges are at large to apply it to any and all relationships. Its flexi-
bility is in its scope once it has been determined that some process is
due.14
The Court proceeded with an examination of the nature of the parolee's
interest in his conditional liberty, concluding:
[T]he liberty of a parolee . .. includes many of the core values of un-
qualified liberty and its termination inflicts a "grievos loss" on the
parolee . . . . [T]he liberty is valuable and must be seen as within
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. 115
Morrissey reiterates the direction to lower courts to examine the in-
terest advanced in order to determine whether it is entitled to Fourteenth
109. Id. at 86, 89, 90.
110. Id. at 84 (emphasis added).
111. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
261-62 (1970). But cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86-90-& n.21 (1972); Sniadach
v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340-42 (1969).
112. Boddie v. Connecticut 401 U.S. 371, 390, 393-94 (1971) (Black, J., dissent-
ing); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 275-76 (1970) (Black, L, dissenting); Wheeler v.
Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280, 282 (1970) (Burger, CJ., dissenting); Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 344 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting); see O'Neil, Of
Justice Delayed and Justice Denied: The Welfare Prior Hearing Cases, 1970 Sup. Cr.
L. RFv. 161, 179-82.
113. 407 U.S. at 90 n.21.
114. 408 U.S. at 481 (emphasis added); cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 86.
115. 408 U.S. at 482 (emphasis added).
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Amendment protection. The Court particularly emphasized the neces-
sity for such an analysis where the interest advanced relates to the
"liberty" language of the amendment. Only after it has been determined
that the nature of the interest is within the contemplation of the amend-
ment does it become necessary to decide whether its importance or
weight, as balanced against the government's interest, demands some
procedural safeguards.""
Interestingly, Justice Douglas in his dissent concurred in the Court's
insistence that the interest to be protected must be one encompassed
by the Fourteenth Amendment.117 Justice Douglas opined
The Court [has] said . . . that a "pardon is a deed." The same
can be said of a parole, which when conferred gives the parolee a de-
gree of liberty which is often associated with property interests."1
8
THE NATURE OF THE PROCESS REQUIRED
Having found the parolee's interest in his conditional liberty to be
within the ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court proceeded to
assess the importance of the individual and governmental interests at
issue. Perhaps this process was best characterized in Justice Douglas'
reference to Goldberg v. Kelly,"x9 wherein the Court reiterated that:
The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the re-
cipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be 'condemned to
suffer grievous loss' . . . and depends upon whether the recipient's in-
terest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in sum-
116. Id. at 481. The Court has clarified the Fuentes and Morrissey approach in Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). In Roth, a non-tenured professor was not
rehired after completing one academic year of a four year probationary period. He
alleged, inter alia, that his right to procedural due process was violated by the Uni-
versity official's failure to give him notice of any reason for nonretention and an
opportunity for a hearing. Id. at 569. The district court had decided that the Four-
teenth Amendment was applicable by "assessing and balancing the weights of the
particular interests involved," (Id. at 570) and granted summary judgment on the issue
of procedural due process. In reversing, the Court stated:.
mo-determine whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we must
look not to the "weight" but to the nature of the interest at stake. We must look
to see if the interest is within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty
and property. Id. at 570-71 (emphasis added and citations omitted).
The Court emphatically adduced: "Mhe words 'liberty' and 'property' in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment must be given some meaning." Id.
at 572. The Court concluded that the professor had not been deprived of an interest
within the contemplation of the Due Process Clause. Id. at 579.
But cf. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
117. 408 U.S. at 495; cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 384-85 (1971)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
118; 408 U.S. at 493 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
119. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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mary adjudication. 120
While recognizing that a parolee's interest in his indeterminate liberty
compels some "orderly process,"'121 the majority in Morrissey emphati-
cally rejected the adoption of a rigid set of procedural rules as being
antipathetic to the governmental interests involved. Obviously, a
state's willingness to meliorate the position of a person who has been
convicted of a crime against its people should not be taken as negating
the state's awareness that a parolee continues to present a substantial
threat to its citizenry.1 22  Accordingly, Chief Justice Burger asserted:
[A] State has an overwhelming interest in being able to return the in-
dividual to imprisonment without the burden of a new adversary crim-
inal trial if in fact he has failed to abide by the conditions of his pa-
role.1 2
3
Yet of equal import, the Chief Justice concluded, is the state's interest
in avoiding unjustified revocation of parole and elimination of any op-
portunity to integrate the individual into society:
[T]he State has no interest in revoking parole without some informal
procedural guarantees. . . . A simple factual hearing will not inter-
fere with the exercise of discretion ...
Society . . . has an interest in not having parole revoked because of
erroneous information or because of an erroneous evaluation of the
need to revoke parole, given the breach of parole conditions ...
And society has a further interest in treating the parolee with basic fair-
ness: fair treatment in parole revocations will enhance the chance of
rehabilitation by avoiding reactions to arbitrariness.1 24
Such reasoning evidenced a predilection on the part of the majority to
inject some "orderly process" into both the objective determination
of whether a violation had occurred and into the discretionary evalua-
tion of whether parole should be revoked.
Generally, the effect of due process is to inhibit a person from taking
another's liberty or property by means "contrary to the settled usages and
modes of procedure."' 2 5 The guarantee does not require any particular
form of procedure126 s long as it is in accordance with natural, inherent,
and fundamental principles of justice. 2 ' At the outset, it must be recog-
120. 408 U.S. at 494, quoting _Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 -U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970)
(citation omitted).
121. 408 U.S. at 482.
122. Id. at 483.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 483-84 (citation and footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
125. Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales, 230 U.S. 139, 161 (1913).
126. Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 255 (1907).
127. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 390-91 (1898).
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nized that "[a] procedural rule that may satisfy due process in one context
may not necessarily satisfy procedural due process in every case."'28
With this broad definition as a basis, a perusal of the demands of due
process as expounded in various cases will have a significant bearing on
the demands required for parole revocation.
In Bell v. Burson'20 the Supreme Court considered the issue of
whether the motor vehicle registration and driver's license of an unin-
sured motorist involved in an accident could be suspended unless he
posted security for the damages.' s0 In denying the validity of the
state statute, the Court held "that procedural due process will be satis-
fied by an inquiry limited to the determination whether there is a rea-
sonable possibility of judgments in the amounts claimed being rendered
against the licensee.' 13' Succinctly, the Court merely reaffirmed prior
decisions indicating that a hearing required by the Due Process Clause
must be meaningful and appropriate to the nature of the case.
Other cases declaring particular statutes unconstitutional on due
process grounds have arisen in such areas as creditors' rights8 2 and
employment. 13  While holding, generally, that due process demanded
notice and a prior hearing, these decisions did not delineate with any
specificity the procedural requirements of due process. In contrast,
the Court's recent decision in Goldberg v. Kelly'3 4 adopted a more
definitive approach and explicated the precise procedure required by
due process for the termination of welfare benefits.
In Goldberg, which was cited in all three opinions in Morrissey, wel-
fare recipients challenged the termination of welfare payments, which
128. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971).
129. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
130. Id. at .540.
131. Id. (citations omitted), quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552
(1965); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
132. See, e.g., Sniadach v.- Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). There, a
Wisconsin statute permitted a prejudgment garnishment procedure whereby defendant's
wages were frozen in the interim between the garnishment and the culmination of the
main suit without defendant having a chance to be heard. The statute was held to
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it provided for
the taking'of property withfoit 'otice and prior heiring. id; at 340-41.
133. See, e.g., Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956). There,
a college teacher was summarily discharged without a notice or hearing, pursuant to a
New York City Charter provision, because he relied on his privilege against self-
incrimination in refusing to answer questions about his official conduct. The dis-
charge without notice or prior hearing was held to violate the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 559.
134. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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had occurred without prior notice or a hearing, as being violative of the
Due Process Clause.' 35 In allowing this challenge, Justice Brennan, writ-
ing for the majority, outlined the particular demands of due process for
the termination of such benefits. Initially, a "pretermination evidenti-
ary hearing" was required. 3 This "hearing need not take the form of
a judicial or quasi-judicial trial," but the recipient must be given "timely
and adequate notice" including an explanation of the reasons for the
proposed termination.13 7  He must also be given the opportunity to de-
fend himself by confronting adverse witnesses and by presenting his
own arguments and evidence before the decision maker.'3 8  While the
Court did not require the appointment of counsel, the recipient must
be allowed to retain an attorney if he so desires.' 3 9 The decision
maker must be impartial and, although he may have prior involvement
in some aspects of the case, he should not be the one who made the
determination under review. 40 Upon conclusion, the decision maker
should state the reasons for his determination and indicate the evidence
he relied on though this need not be a full opinion nor a formal finding
of fact or conclusion of law.'
41
Goldberg, therefore, defined the minimum procedures consistent
with due process in the case of a termination of welfare benefits. The
parolee is no more or less a beneficiary of legislative grace than is a wel-
fare recipient and thus the demands of due process should be similar in
the two situations. The major distinction between the two is that the
welfare recipient faces the loss of financial assistance and thus has
a "property" interest at stake, while the parolee faces incarceration and
has a "liberty" interest at stake.14  Both interests, however, are pro-
tected by the language of the Fourteenth Amendment.
THE DEMANDS OF DuE-PROCESS AT PAROLE REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS
In Morrissey, Chief Justice Burger began his discussion of the de-
135. Id. at 255-56.
136. Id. at 264.
137. Id. at 266-68.
138. Id. at 267-68.
139. Id. at 270. Query how a welfare recipient who, by the very qualification for
such benefits, is indigent can afford retained counsel.
140. ld. at 271.
141. Id.
142. However, in the welfare area the distinction between "economics" (the "prop-
erty" interest) and "life" (also an interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment)
may become "blurred when the money involved constitutes a subsistence-level income."
Van Dyke, Parole Revocation Hearings in California: The Right to Counsel, 59 CALip.
L. R'V. 1215, 1254 n.187 (1971).
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mands of due process with Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v.
McElroy.143  In that case, the superintendent of a gun factory termi-
nated the employment of a cook without a hearing because she failed
to meet certain security requirements. The determination that security
requirements were not met was made by a security officer. Although
the Court upheld the termination without a hearing, it made it clear
that "[tihe very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexi-
ble procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation. 44
The Court continued by declaring that:
Consideration of what procedures due process may require under any
given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the pre-
cise nature of the governmental function involved as well as of the
private interest that has been affected by governmental action.' 45
Chief Justice Burger's approach in Morrissey contemplated two dis-
tinct stages in a parole revocation: "The first stage occurs when the
parolee is arrested and detained. . . . The second occurs when parole
is formally revoked.' 46  The first step in the bifurcated process was
obviously the result of an evidentiary concern. The locale of the arrest
and incarceration is typically the place of violation and provides the
earliest opportunity to examine the evidence "while information is fresh
and sources are available." Chief Justice Burger concluded that:
[D]ue process would seem to require that some minimal inquiry be con-
ducted at or reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation or
arrest and as promptly as convenient after arrest. .... 147
While the "minimal inquiry" was perceived by the Chief Justice to be "in
the nature of a 'preliminary hearing',' 148 it is certain that he did not
intend to inject a comparable adversary quality into this preliminary
inquiry. 14  The sole purpose of the inquiry should be to determine
whether there was probable cause or reasonable grounds to believe that
the parolee had in fact violated parole conditions.5 0 To ensure an
accurate evidentiary basis for such a determination, the majority con-
143. 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
144. Id. at 895 (citations omitted).
145. Id.
146. 408 U.S. at 485.
147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. Id.
149. A preliminary hearing serves an analogous purpose in that it is a hearing to
determine whether probable cause exists to believe a crime has been committed. See
Rideout v. Superior Ct., 67 Cal. 2d 471, 432 P.2d 197, 62 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1967).
See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (Court held the individual was en-
titled to retained counsel at the preliminary hearing).
150. 408 U.S. at 485.
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cluded that due process required that the parolee be provided: (1).an
impartial hearing officer; (2) notice of the alleged violations and
impending hearing; (3) an opportunity to appear and speak in his
own behalf; (4) an opportunity to present relevant documents and
witness testimony; (5) the ability to request that persons who have
given adverse information be made available for questioning in his
presence; and (6) a written summarization by the hearing officer of the
reasons for the determination and the evidence relied on.'51 The ma-
jority emphasized, however, that these requirements could be effectuated
through informal procedures: "No interest would be served by formalism
in this process; informality will not lessen the utility of this inquiry in
reducing the risk of error."'
52
The second stage of the revocation process is the presentation of
the case to the parole board for a final determination as to whether
violations have occurred and, if so, whether revocation is warranted.
Chief Justice Burger concluded that the minimum requirements of due
process at this stage include: (1) written notice of the alleged violations;
(2) disclosure to the parolee of adverse evidence; (3) an opportunity
to be heard and present evidence within a reasonable time after the
parolee's return to custody;'53 (4) the right to confront and cross ex-
amine adverse witnesses; (5) a neutral hearing body; and (6) a written
statement by the hearing body as to the evidence relied on and the rea-
sons for revocation.' 54  The Chief Justice again cautioned that "there
is no thought to equate this second stage of parole revocation to a
criminal prosecution in any sense.' 5
5
The Chief Justice, in formulating the procedural requisites for the
preliminary inquiry, presupposed that the parolee would already have
been arrested pursuant to his parole officer's direction. Justice Douglas,
in his dissent, objected to this notion that a parolee's conditional liberty
should be terminated, even temporarily, without a prior hearing. Justice
Douglas argued:
If a violation of a condition of parole is involved, rather than the com-
mission of a new offense, there should not be an arrest of the parolee.
. . . Rather, notice of the alleged violations should be given to the
151. Id. at 486-87.
152. Id. at 487.
153. Although not approving of other aspects of Iowa's procedure, the Court indi-
cated that a lapse of two months before a revocation hearing was held might not be
unreasonable. Id. at 488. However, this was predicated on an assumption that the
parolee had been returned to custody after a neutral hearing officer had concluded
there existed reasonable grounds upon which to return him. See note 38 supra.
154. 408 U.S. at 489.
155. Id.
1973]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
parolee and a time set for a hearing.156
Justice Douglas reasoned that no interest would be served by arrest-
ing the parolee for such violations. If serious violations of parole were
committed, the parolee would be arrested by the proper authorities on
charges related to such violations. 15 7
The purpose of the initial hearing as envisioned by Justice Douglas
would be to conclusively deduce whether or not a violation had occurred,
not merely to ascertain whether reasonable grounds existed to believe
such a violation had occurred.,58 Justice Douglas would have provided
the parolee with this opportunity to prove his innocence or present
matters of mitigation. The parolee's liberty would not be curtailed until
the results of the hearing were known and the parole board ordered
revocation. 5 9
Justice Douglas also contemplated a bifurcated revocation proceed-
ing. Whereas Chief Justice Burger described the two steps as a pre-
liminary hearing to determine probable cause followed by the actual
revocation hearing, Justice Douglas saw them as being, first, a factual
hearing to determine if a violation had occurred and, second, a sub-
mission to the parole board for final action. 60 Ostensibly, Justice
Douglas intended the sole issue before the parole board to be whether
parole should be revoked on the basis of the factual conclusions estab-
lished at the prior hearing. Justice Douglas did not state whether the
parole board would be required to provide a hearing when deciding the
156. Id. at 497-98 (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 497 n.8. It should be noted that the reasoning Justice Douglas appar-
ently used is drawn from a quote from Judge Skelly Wright in Hyser v. Reed, 318
F.2d 225, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (concurring in part and dissenting in part). A
study of Hyser gives no indication as to what constitutes a "serious violation."
The reliance on such specious terminology could lend itself to an interpretation that
"serious violation" could include such things as territorial violations for which no
arrest would be made by local authorities. Such an interpretation, although logical on
its face, is insubstantial because Justice Douglas clearly stated in Morrissey that the
distinction is between the violation of conditions and the commission of new of-
fenses. 408 U.S. at 497. A similar distinction has been registered in regard to proba-
tion violations whereby violations which involve convictions for a new felony or mis-
demeanor are distinguished from such violations as failure to submit monthly reports,
traffic violations,, purchasing an automobile without permission, marrying without
permission, or quitting a job without permission, which are categorized as "minor
violations." C. NEWMAN, SOURCBOOK ON PROBATION, PAROLE AND PARDONS, 133-34
(3d ed. 1970). Based on this interpretation, it is clear that Justice Douglas feels that
if no arrest is made by the local authorities for a new offense, no independent arrest
for violation of any parole condition should be made prior to a parole revocation
hearing.
158. 408 U.S. at 499.
159. Id. at 500.
160. Id. at 499.
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appropriate course of action. However, he intimated that after a revoca-
tion a returnee should be given an opportunity to comment as to ex-
tenuating circumstances and to persuade the board of the disutility of
reimprisonment. 161
Notwithstanding any disparity in the individual justices' perception
of the parole process, all were in accord as to the basic issue of injecting
equitable procedure into this process. Initially, it was agreed that the
officer in charge of the hearing should not be the parole officer who
recommended revocation.162 Chief Justice Burger based this require-
161. Id. at 500 n.13. Justice Douglas was singularly ambiguous in his discussion
concerning the procedural protections, if any, the parole board would have to provide
in evaluating the appropriateness of revocation. Throughout his dissent he seemed to
suggest that only one hearing was required by due process. Generally, Justice Douglas
directed that the parolee be provided: (1) A hearing before a neutral hearing officer;
(2) notice of the alleged violations; (3) advice of counsel; and (4) right to confronta-
tion. Id. at 497-99. The purpose of these safeguards was to ensure the accuracy of
the conclusive determination of whether or not a violation had occurred. Justice
Douglas opined:
The hearing is to determine the fact of parole violation. The results of the
hearing would go to the parole board . . . as would cases which involved voluntary
admission of violations. Id. at 499 (emphasis added).
The purview of this hearing was directed solely at the factual finding of a violation.
Justice Douglas made no proviso for a parolee to explain his actions or comment as to
extenuating circumstances. To do so would be to effectively admit such violations.
Logically such explanation or commentary would not be relevant in a hearing de-
signed only to deduce the fact of a violation, nor would it be necessary or even desir-
able for the hearing officer to consider such matters in his determination. The parole
board is the body concerned with the appropriateness of revocation; and such commen-
tary or explanation would only be relevant at this stage wherein the effective decision
to revoke parole is made. Accordingly, one of two conclusions can be drawn. Justice
Douglas either intended to preclude such considerations entirely from the parole revo-
cation process, or he contemplated an opportunity should be provided the parolee to
present these matters in a hearing wherein they would have some relevance. The
latter conclusion is the most probable, for the former is patently inconsistent with the
tenor of Justice Douglas' attempt to ensure that the decision to revoke be made pur-
suant to reasoned and informed judgment. Id. at 495. In many cases where a con-
sideration of the objective facts would indicate the appropriateness of revocation, an
explanation of the parolee's actions, commentary on extenuating circumstance, or per-
sonal assurances of guarded future conduct might dissuade the board from this con-
clusion. Moreover, where a parolee would voluntarily admit to violations, the only
evidence conveyed to the board would be an acknowledgment of these admissions.
Such a conclusion would certainly be at odds with Douglas' attempt to inject some
"fairness" into the parole revocation process as well as his apparent approbation of
the essence of the American Correctional Association's standards which mandate
analogous procedures. Id. at 500 n.13.
Generally, in cases where the parolee voluntarily admits to violations some form of
hearing is provided. Although no evidentiary hearing is required the board should
provide the parolee with an "informal interview" wherein the parolee can present
mitigating factors. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 256-57 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
162. 408 U.S. at 485, 497-98.
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ment on Goldberg v. Kelly.168  In that case, it was held that pro-
cedural due process required an evidentiary hearing prior to the termi-
nation of welfare benefits. 6 4  Although the decision maker required
by Goldberg is not disqualified despite some prior involvement with the
case, he should not have participated in making the determination
under review. 16 5 Chief Justice Burger observed in Morrissey that an
"officer directly involved in making recommendations cannot always
have complete objectivity in evaluating them."'166 Similarly, Justice
Douglas in his dissent remarked that:
The hearing should not be before the parole officer, as he is the one
who is making the charge and "there is inherent danger in combining
the functions of judge and advocate."'
167
Chief Justice Burger did not feel that the hearing officer need be a
judicial officer for either hearing. Nor did he require that the officer
at the preliminary hearing be the "traditional neutral and detached of-
ficer." 68  He did, however, include the requirement of a "'neutral
and detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole board" for
revocation hearings. 69 The inclusion of this requirement for revoca-
tion hearings and the exclusion at preliminary hearings implies that,
although at preliminary hearings it is sufficient that the hearing officer
not be the one who made the charge of parole violation,'170 at revocation
hearings the decision making body cannot include anyone who has
been previously connected with the case.'
71
The second issue of general agreement was that of notice. The ma-
163. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
164. Id. at 264, 266-71.
165. Id. at 271.
166. 408 U.S. at 486.
167. Id. at 497-98, quoting Jones v. Rivers, 338 F.2d 862, 877 (4th Cir. 1964)
(Sobeloff, C. J., concurring). Jones was a habeas corpus proceeding wherein the court
affirmed the district court's ruling that due process did not require that indigent
parolees be provided with counsel when they appear before the parole board, a member
thereof or an examiner appointed by the board. However, the court also directed that
the parolee was entitled to be advised of his right to be represented by retained counsel.
Chief Judge Sobeloff stated that parole boards and their agents have the duty of func-
tioning in the interest of the parolee in an advisory capacity and thus must see to it that
the hearing is conducted fairly and impartially. The Chief Judge opined that it was no
reflection on those officials, however, to recognize that in our system of jurisprudence
there is inherent danger in combining the functions of judge and advocate. Id.
Note, however, that this argument is used in Jones as a reason for requiring retained
counsel and not in the sense of a neutral or detached decision maker.
168. 408 U.S. at 486, citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
169. 408 U.S. at 489.
170. Id. at 486.
171. 408 U.S. at 489.
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jority required notice of the preliminary hearing and of its purpose.172
At the revocation hearing, "written notice of the claimed violations of
parole" is required.173  Justice Douglas also required notice, but the
notice would be prior to any arrest.'7
4
It is arguable that the objectives sought to be served by Justice
Douglas' notice requirement differs from those intended by the ma-
jority. Although under the majority's mandate notice should be given
prior to the actual hearings, the parolee is already incarcerated and
thus his effectiveness in gathering evidence for his defense is severely
limited. Unless he has friends or relatives who are unusually capable, or
unless he is provided with the right to counsel, the speciousness of the
Court's notice requirements is apparent. 75 It can be concluded that the
sole objective of a notice requirement under such circumstances is clarifi-
cation of the alleged violations in order to be consistent with some
ethereal notion of due process. In contrast, notice in Justice Douglas'
conceptualization of the revocation process is a functional procedure
intended to notify the parolee of the alleged violation at a time when he
is still able to actively prepare his defense.
The third area of general agreement concerned the opportunity for the
parolee to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documen-
tary evidence.'17  Justice Douglas additionally emphasized the value
and necessity of counsel in the presentation of the parolee's case to the
hearing officer.
177
The fourth issue of agreement was that of cross-examination. The
majority stated it as a definite requirement at both hearings unless the
hearing officer specifically found good cause for not allowing it.'73
Justice Douglas, however, gave only cursory consideration to this pro-
cedural aspect. He stated that although such hearings do not require
"the full panoply of rights applicable to a criminal trial. . . confronta-
tion may . . .be necessary .... ,-79 Ostensibly, such a conclusion
172. 408 U.S. at 486-87.
173. Id. at 489.
174. Id. at 497. The notice Justice Douglas required includes the time of the
hearing and the alleged charges.
175. MODEL PnNAL CODE § 305.16 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962), however,
provides that the parole board staff should render reasonable aid to the parolee in
preparation for the hearing. How effective would this be considering the massive
workload of the staff?
176. 408 U.S. at 487, 489, 500.
177. Id. at 498.
178. Id. at 487, 489.
179. Id. at 499 (emphasis added), citing Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77
(1957).
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leaves undecided who is to determine the necessity of confrontation in a
particular hearing. If the hearing officer is to evaluate the utility of con-
frontation, this would support the view that confrontation is not a definite
requirement. Justice Douglas' reference to Roviaro v. United States,1 0
however, might well indicate that he did not intend "may" to mean at
the discretion of the officer, but at the discretion of the parolee.' 8 '
Moreover, Justice Douglas' reference to the necessity of counsel to "see
that .. .vague and insubstantial allegations [are] discounted"'18 2 sup-
ports the view that confrontation and cross-examination are require-
ments. However, both the majority and Justice Douglas allowed for
the denial of confrontation and cross examination by the hearing officer
when disclosure of a witness' identity would endanger him.8 3
The final area of agreement concerned the requirement that the
hearing officer prepare a written summarization "of what occurs at the
hearing in terms of the responses of the parolee and the [evidence for
and against revocation]" and a statement of the "'reasons for [the
hearing officer's] determination and . . . the evidence he relied on.' 1,84
The hearing officer at the preliminary hearing and the hearing body-
usually the parole board-at the revocation hearing were each directed
to prepare such a summary. While Justice Douglas did not expressly
comment on this requirement, his reference to the Court's decision in
Kent v. United States,185 wherein the Court opined: "there is no place
in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous conse-
quences .. . without a statement of reasons,"'' 8  suggests that he
would have imposed a similar requirement in the parole revocation
process.
ThE RIGHT To COUNSEL
The issue of right to counsel was not raised before the Court, 87 and
180. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
181. In Roviaro, the Court held that the trial court erred in denying the petitioner's
request for disclosure of the informer's identity as well as denying, prior to trial, a
motion for a bill of particulars requesting the informant's identity and address. Id. at 65
n.15.
182. 408 U.S. at 498.
183. Id. at 487, 499. The Government has a privilege to withhold disclosing the iden-
tity of informants. The purpose of the privilege is the furtherance and protection of
the public interest in effective law enforcement. Such a rule encourages citizens to
communicate their knowledge of the commission of crimes. Note, however, that
where disclosure is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must
give way. Id.
184. 408 U.S. at 487, quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).
185. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
186. 408 U.S. at 495-96, quoting Kent v. -United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
187. Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942, 950 n.10 (8th Cir. 1971):
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therefore it understandably declined to advise on this issue:
We do not reach or decide the question whether the parolee is en-
titled to the assistance of retained counsel or to appointed counsel if he
is indigent.'
88
Notwithstanding this refusal to consider whether a parolee is entitled
to counsel at either hearing, the Court intimated that some assistance
should be provided to the parolee.
189
To study the implications and impact that Morrissey will have on the
issue of right to counsel at parole revocation hearings, it is unnecessary
to trace the historical development of the right to counsel. Instead, a
considered observation of the law as it presently stands should give in-
sight into the effect Morrissey will have, if indeed it will have any ef-
fect at all. Significant areas which may influence the ultimate con-
clusion in parole revocation proceedings are: the statutory requirement
of counsel in federal and state parole proceedings; the extension of
the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions to include probation; and
the requirement of counsel in hearings of other administrative agencies.
Title 18 of the United States Code is silent as to whether a parolee is
entitled to the right to counsel at federal parole revocation proceed-
ings.' 90 In Fleming v. Tate'9' the District of Columbia's parole stat-
ute, which required that a parolee "be given an opportunity to appear
before [the] Board", was interpreted as meaning an effective appear-
ance which necessarily included the presence of counsel if the parolee so
elected.' 92  In Robbins v. Reed, 93 the court recognized the similarity
between the District of Columbia statute and the federal statute, and thus
interpreted the federal statute as also affording the right to counsel. 94
Since this interpretation was based on the implications of the federal
Appellants do not seek relief on the basis of denial of counsel but merely argue
that the Mempa holding supports their contention of a right to a hearing as a
requirement of due process.
188. 408 U.S. at 489 (footnote omitted).
189. In declining to decide the issue of whether counsel, either appointed or re-
tained, was required in the present circumstances the court made reference (408
U.S. at 489 n.16) to MODEL PENAL CODE § 305.15(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962)
which provides:
The institutional parole staff shall render reasonable aid to the parolee in Prepara-
tion for the hearing and he shall be permitted to advise with his own legal counsel.
At the very least, this reference was intended to evidence the Court's approbation of
such practices without making it an absolute requirement.
190. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-10 (1970).
191. 156 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
192. Id. at 849.
193. 269 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
194. Id. at 243-44.
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statute rather than the requirements of due process,19 an equal protec-
tion argument was avoided and the courts have not interpreted the statute
to require appointment of counsel for indigents.
19 6
State law concerning the right to counsel at parole proceedings has
taken divergent directions. The most progressive trend is exemplified
by New York's procedure. In People v. Warden,19 7 the New York
Court of Appeals held that the state constitution guaranteed the parolee's
right to be accompanied by retained counsel at his parole revocation
hearing. 198 Further, the court recognized that the parolee had a right
to counsel at parole revocation hearings based not merely on the state
constitution, but also on the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the United States Constitution.'99  In contrast, the state of
Utah exemplifies the line of authority which has consistently denied the
right to counsel at parole revocation hearings. In Beal v. Turner,
20 0
the Supreme Court of Utah held that the failure to appoint counsel
for the parolee at the revocation proceeding did not violate due proc-
ess.2 01 In so deciding, the court stated that it did not accept, as authority
for the law of the state, the rulings of federal district courts which recog-
nized the right to counsel as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.20 2 The laws
of the various states range from the absolute right to counsel recognized
in New York to the absolute denial of right to counsel208 in Utah, and,
195. Note, Parole Revocation in the Federal System, 56 GEo. LJ. 705, 719 (1968).
196. See Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963), wherein they recognized
the right to retain counsel but refused court-appointed counsel concluding that parole
revocation was not a criminal proceeding within the meaning of the Sixth Amend-
ment. The Hyser court relied on Jones v. Rivers, 338 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1964),
wherein the court held that parole revocation was not a criminal prosecution re-
quiring appointed counsel and that the parole board was not a judicial body possessing
the power, statutory or otherwise, to appoint an attorney. The court further referred
to Martin v. United States Bd. of Parole, 199 F. Supp. 542 (D.C.D.C. 1961) which held
that the constitutional right to counsel only applied to trials in court and not to parole
hearings, and thus retained counsel was allowed only as a matter of statutory inter-
pretation based on Fleming v. Tate, 156 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
197. 27 N.Y.2d 376, 267 N.E.2d 238, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971).
198. Id. at 380, 267 N.E.2d at 240, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
199. Id. at 380-83, 267 N.E.2d at 240-42, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 452-54.
200. 22 Utah 2d 418, 454 P.2d 624 (1969).
201. Id. at 419, 454 P.2d at 625.
202. Id.
203. In United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut Bd. of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079, 1084-85
n.11 (2d Cir. 1971), it was stated that Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), under-
mined the rationale of cases which sustained a denial of right to counsel in parole
revocation proceedings because parole was a matter of "grace." See Shaw v. Hender-
son, 430 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1970).
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as such, do not provide a clear picture of state policy which the Court
could consider when it is directly confronted with the issue of right to
counsel.
204
The right to counsel in criminal prosecutions is guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment of the Constitution. This was made applicable to
the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment in Gideon v. Wain-
wright,205 which held, inter alia, that the appointment of counsel for
an indigent was required at every stage of a criminal proceeding where
substantial rights of the accused could be affected. 20 6 The area of
criminal prosecution which is most analogous to parole revocation is
the field of probation revocation.2 7  The leading case in that area is
Mempa v. Rhay.20 8  In Mempa, the Court recognized that probation
revocation proceedings are part of a criminal prosecution 20 9 and that
counsel must be afforded at such proceedings. 210
204. It should also be noted that, while some states deny counsel at parole revoca-
tion hearings and others absolutely allow it, a middle ground appears to have emerged
whereby counsel may be granted on a case by case determination. The Ninth Circuit
has intimated at such an approach. Dennis v. California Adult Authority, 456 F.2d 1240
(9th Cir. 1972). In Dennis, the court upheld a denial of counsel where the parolee ad-
mitted operating a car with a suspended license; however, it stated:
It remains to be determined in each case whether the procedures followed
were reasonably and fairly designed to enable it to ascertain whether issues ex-
isted concerning the asserted violation and to make an informed decision upon
such issues. Id. at 1241.
See Wilburn v. Nelson, 458 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1972) (counsel was denied at parole
hearing, but the court recognized that a contrary result might be more appropriate in
other cases) and M'Clary v. California Adult Authority, 446 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir.
1972). In M'Clary, the parolee challenged revocation because he was not allowed right
to counsel nor to confront witnesses. The court remanded the habeas corpus petition to
the district court for consideration in light of Dennis and Wilburn and recognized that
it is possible under the circumstances of a particular case that a parolee might be en-
titled to additional procedural safeguards.
205. 372 U.S. 335 (1962).
206. Id. at 344-45.
207. Another analogous area is that of juvenile proceedings. It had been argued that
juvenile proceedings were nonadversary and that since the state was proceeding as
parens patriae, juveniles could be excluded from constitutional protections. This argu-
ment, however, has not been recognized and the right to retained or appointed counsel
has been applied to such proceedings. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); see Note, Parole
Revocation in the Federal System, 56 GEo. L.I 705, 722. See also Mack, The Juve-
nile Court, 23 HARv. L. REv. 104, 109-11 (1909).
208. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
209. For a discussion of the critical nature of sentencing in a criminal case see
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948). See also Nunley v. United States, 283
F.2d 651 (10th Cir. 1960); McKinney v. United States, 208 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1953);
Martin v. United States, 182 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1950).
210. 389 U.S. at 137. This includes the right to appointed counsel. The Court
stated:
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In the non-criminal field, Goldberg v. Kelly211 is the leading case
which defines broad procedural requirements based on the Due Proc-
ess Clause. In speaking of the right to counsel at welfare benefit
termination hearings, the Court stated, "[w]e do not say that counsel
must be provided at the pre-termination hearing, but only that the
recipient must be allowed to retain an attorney if he so desires.
212
Consequently, retained counsel is a constitutional requirement, but ap-
pointed counsel at such hearings is not.
Obviously, the Morrissey Court's refusal to consider the right to
retained or appointed counsel in parole revocation proceedings, when
passing upon the procedural requirements in such proceedings, will be
interpreted by some to mean that counsel is not required. Support for
such an argument is evident in the Court's assertion, "[w]e emphasize
there is no thought to equate . . .parole revocation to a criminal
prosecution in any sense. .... ,,2'3 Gideon v. Wainwright21 4 guaranteed
the right to counsel only in state criminal proceedings. Since the Court
did not intend parole revocation hearings to be part of the criminal
prosecution, and since they expressly declined to include right to counsel
as a procedural requirement at this point, it is arguable that the right to
counsel is not one of the minimum requirements of due process. 21 '
We assume counsel appointed for the purpose of the trial or guilty plea would not
be unduly burdened by being requested to follow through at the deferred sentencing
stage of the proceeding. Id.
211. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
212. Id. at 270.
213. 408 U.S. at 489.
214. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Gideon quotes the Sixth Amendment as providing that
"Ein all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . .. to have the As-
sistance of Counsel for his defence." Id. at 339 (emphasis added). It stands for
the precept that an indigent has an absolute right to appointment of counsel in felony
cases. Id. at 336-48. Recently, in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), the
Court extended the right to appointment of counsel to any situation where the defendant
could be imprisoned as a result of conviction, regardless of whether the crime charged
is classified as a felony or as a misdemeanor.
.215. It should be noted here that in addition to the legal objections to the right to
counsel at parole revocation hearings there are also two practical objections. The first,
expressed in Williams v. Dunbar, 377 F.2d 505, 506 (9th Cir. 1967), is that counsel
might impede the parole process. This has largely been discounted. For example,
Michigan has one of the highest rates of parole in the country and they have long
recognized extensive due process rights, including the right to retained counsel. See
MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.2310(1) (Supp. 1968); Warren v. Michigan Parole Bd., 23
Mich. App. 754, 179 N.W.2d 664 (1970); Sklar, Law and Practice in Probation and
Parole Revocation Hearings, 55 J. CiuM. L.C. & P.S., 175, 194 n.157 (1964). It
seems contrary to common sense that the Supreme Court would allow the relatively
small increase in administrative burden to influence its decision on such a vital issue.
See United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut State Bd. of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079, 1089
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The majority's reluctance to include the right to counsel prompted
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion. He based his opinion on Gold-
berg v. Kelly, 16 stating that Goldberg plainly dictated that the right to
retained counsel was one of the minimum requirements of due process.217
The only question Justice Brennan felt should have remained unanswered
was whether counsel must be furnished to the parolee if he is indigent.
2 18
Justice Brennan's inclusion of the right to retained counsel as well as
the majority's intimation that some assistance should be allowed could
be relied on as predicates for the right to retained counsel. If the right
to retained counsel were recognized, the Court would inevitably be
confronted with an argument for appointed counsel based on the Equal
Protection Clause.
21 9
(2d Cir. 1971). The second objection is that allowing the right to counsel might over-
tax the resources of the bar. In Re Tucker, 5 Cal. 3d 171, 182, 486 P.2d 657, 663, 95
Cal. Rptr. 761, 767 (1971). In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), it was
suggested that the tremendous increase in admission to law schools and to the bar were
more than enough to meet the demands, and law students may be an additional
supply of manpower to provide legal assistance for the indigent. Id. at 40-41.
But cf. note 236 infra.
216. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
217. 408 U.S. at 491, citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970).
218. 408 U.S. at 491.
219. Since parole is a statutory creation, many jurisdictions have held that the
right to counsel is statutory and not constitutional, and thus equal protection attacks
have been avoided. Fleming v. Tate, 156 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Poole v.
Stevens, 190 F. Supp. 938 (1960). Cases which have recognized constitutional protec-
tions included both the right to retained and appointed counsel thereby rendering un-
necessary an equal protection argument. People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, 27
N.Y.2d 376, 267 N.E.2d 238, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971); People ex rel. Combs v.
LaVallee, 29 App. Div. 2d 128, 286 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1968).
In Perry v. Williard, 247 Ore. 145, 427 P.2d 1020 (1967), however, an equal pro-
tection argument was applied to probation hearings. The court concluded that "if a
probationer with money is entitled to retained counsel, an indigent is entitled to ap-
pointed counsel." Id. at 149, 427 P.2d at 1022. This may be a significant argument in
conjunction with the Goldberg case because in Perry probation was not considered
to be a part of a criminal prosecution, but the court asserted that "the distinction does
not justify the denial of equal protection of the laws when liberty is concerned." Id.,
427 P.2d at 1023.
In criminal trials, it is clear that discrimination because of poverty is a denial of
equal protection. In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), indigent defendants
challenged the denial of a request for transcript for appeal of their convictions. In
holding the denial to be violative of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court stated:
In criminal trials a state can no more discriminate on account of poverty than on
account of religion, race, or color. Plainly the ability to pay costs in advance
bears no rational relationship to a defendant's guilt or innocence and could not be
used as an excuse to deprive a defendant of a fair trial. .. .
There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has. Id. at 17-19.
This rationale was applied to parole revocations in Earnest v. Willingham, 406
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Significantly, Justice Douglas extended Justice Brennan's argument
by stating simply that "the parolee should be entitled to counsel.
220
He did not belabor the subject but merely quoted from the Supreme
Court of Oregon's decision in Perry v. Williard:
221
A hearing in which counsel is absent or is only present on behalf of one
side is inherently unsatisfactory if not unfair. Counsel can see that rele-
vant facts are brought out, vague and insubstantial allegations dis-
counted, and irrelevancies eliminated.
222
Justice Douglas cited three cases in support of his brief argument. 22 3
Hewett v. North Carolina2 24 dealt with the revocation of probation. It
stands for the precept that Mempa v. Rhay,225 which required the right
to counsel in probation revocation proceedings, should be read broadly
and that the appointment of counsel at every stage of criminal proceed-
ings where substantial rights may be affected is mandatory. 220 Revoca-
tion of probation is a stage of a criminal proceeding and "[e]ven if a
new sentence is not imposed, it is the event which makes operative the
loss of liberty" and thus it requires counsel.227 This argument was taken
a step further in Perry v. Williard.2 s In Perry, the court concluded:
It would be somewhat surprising to hold now for the first time that a
wealthy person brought before the court for revocation of probation
could not have the assistance of retained counsel to dispute the alleged
grounds for revocation. . . . We now hold that counsel is not only de-
sirable but is so essential to a fair and trustworthy hearing that due
process of law when liberty is at stake includes a right to counsel. Ac-
cordingly, if a probationer with money is entitled to retained counsel,
an indigent is entitled to appointed counsel. . . . As observed in an-
F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1969), wherein the petitioner on. a mandatory early release which
was revoked brought a habeas corpus proceeding based on a denial of right to counsel.
Referring to Griffin, the court stated:
To pose the question is to answer it, for Griffin and its progeny have made it clear
beyond doubt that where liberty is at stake a State may not grant to one even a
non-constitutional, statutory right such as here involved fright to appear before
parole board under 18 U.S.C. § 4207 with counsel] and deny it to another because
of poverty. Id. at 683-84.
For a discussion of the effect of the Equal Protection Clause in administrative proceed-
ings see Comment, 18 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 758, 776-90 (1971).
220. 408 U.S. at 498.
221. 247 Ore. 145, 427 P.2d 1020 (1967).
222. 408 U.S. at 498, quoting Perry v. Williard, 247 Ore. 145, 148, 427 P.2d 1020,
1022 (1967).
223. 408 U.S. at 498.
224. 415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1969).
225. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
226. 415 F.2d at 1322-25.
227. Id. at 1322.
228. 247 Ore. 145, 427 P.2d 1020 (1967).
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other context, discrimination "on account of poverty" is as unjustifiable
as discrimination on account of religion, race or color. 229
The Perry decision, therefore, recognized the right to retained counsel
in probation revocation hearings, and by applying the Equal Protection
Clause, it also required appointment of counsel for indigents. While
the court in Perry did not consider probation revocation hearings to be
criminal trials, they stated that such a "distinction does not justify the
denial of equal protection of the laws when liberty is concerned."2 30
In People ex rel. Combs v. LaVallee,231 the case law dealing with pro-
bation revocation was applied to parole revocations as well. The court
held that the parolee's constitutional right to be represented by counsel
and afforded due process was violated by the refusal of the parole au-
thority to grant his request for counsel to be present at the "parole
court. ' 232 It reached this decision by discussing probation and the two
basic differences between probation and parole. Unlike probation, it
concluded, under parole the court imposed sentence may not be
changed. 233  Also unlike probation, revocation proceedings based on
a violation of parole are not a part of a criminal proceeding.23 4 The
court discounted these differences, however, stating:
We do not view these differences as so vital that counsel should be
mandated in one and denied in the other. . . . When all the legal
niceties are laid aside a proceeding to revoke parole involves the right
of an individual to continue at liberty or to be imprisoned. It involves
a deprivation of liberty just as much as did the original criminal action
and. . . falls within the due process provision. . . of our State consti-
tution.23
5
A factual question emerges from the Morrissey formula itself which
lends further support to the argument for counsel. Without counsel,
how is a parolee who is in jail awaiting the preliminary hearing or the
revocation hearing supposed to find and interview witnesses, accumulate
documents, prepare for cross-examination of witnesses against him, and,
in general, prepare his case? The obvious answer is that he cannot.
The problem has two solutions. The first is to accept Justice Douglas'
argument that the parolee must be allowed to remain at freedom until
after parole is revoked. If this is unacceptable, then the alternative is
229. Id. at 149, 427 P.2d at 1022.
230. Id. at 149, 427 P.2d at 1023.
231. 29 App. Div. 2d 128, 286 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1968).
232. Id. at 130, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 602.
233. Id. at 131, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
234. Id.
235. Id.; cf. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967). See note 86supra.
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that the parolee must be allowed the assistance of counsel to do the leg
work and prepare his defense. Justice Douglas presented two significant
points of dissent and, when the issue of right to counsel arises again, the
Court will have to reconsider them or render Morrissey ineffective ex-
cept for the formality of the hearing itself.23
236. Since the scope of this Note is very broad, it has been unnecessary to discuss
the effect of Morrissey upon any individual state. However, a brief perusal of Cali-
fornia procedure and the effect that Morrissey will have on it should be illustrative
of the substantial impact the Morrissey decision will have.
Justice Douglas described the California parole system in Morrissey:
[Plarole revocation hearings in California are secretive affairs conducted behind
closed doors and with no written record of the proceedings and in which the paro-
lee is denied the assistance of counsel and the opportunity to present witnesses on
his behalf. 408 U.S. at 498 n.10.
Such a system emerged in California because the California Adult Authority as a
statutory creation (CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 2399-2403 (West 1972)) was given "full power to
suspend, cancel or revoke any parole without notice . . . ." Id. § 3060. Consequently,
the statute has been interpreted as not requiring notice or hearing. People v. Dorado,
62 Cal. 2d 338, 359, 398 P.2d 361, 375, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 183 (1965); In re McLain,
55 Cal. 2d 78, 84-85, 357 P.2d 1080, 1084-85, 9 Cal. Rptr. 824, 828-29 (1960).
Hearings called "Parole and Community Service Hearings," however, are held at
which the Adult Authority, armed only with the parole agent's report and prior case his-
tory, decides if the parolee should be returned to prison. Van Dyke, Parole Revocation
Hearings in California: The Right to Counsel, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 1215, 1219-20 (1971).
The hearings are closed to the public, no transcript is made, and seldom does the panel
give the reasons for its decision. Id. at 1220. After the parolee's return to prison he is
given another hearing at which he can present oral and written evidence. Id. at 1221.
He is not, however, allowed to bring either retained or appointed counsel, present wit-
nesses on his behalf, or cross-examine witnesses against him. Id. These hearings are
also closed to the public and again the reasons for decisions are virtually never given.
Id. At neither of these hearings does the parolee have the right to counsel. See
Lincoln v. California Adult Authority, 435 F.2d 133, 134 (9th Cir. 1970); Mead v.
California Adult Authority, 415 F.2d 767, 768 (9th Cir. 1969).
It is evident that California was one of the least progressive states in granting
rights to parolees at parole revocation hearings. Although hearings were held, they were
secretive and the parolee was denied many of the rights defined in Morrissey. Mor-
rissey should have a noted effect on this procedure. Notice and hearing will be re-
quired, the parolee will have a right to cross-examine witnesses, and the Adult Au-
thority will have to state the reasons and evidence relied on in their determination of
revocation. It is questionable, however, whether Morrissey will require California to
change its practice of denying counsel at the revocation proceeding.
The California Supreme Court in People v. Vickers, 8 Cal.3d 451, 503 P.2d 1313, 105
Cal. Rptr. 305 (1972), applied the specific due process procedures enunciated in Mor-
rissey to probation revocations. Id. at 458, 503 P.2d at 1318, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 310. The
court, while recognizing that Morrissey expressly compelled such procedures only for
parole revocation, concluded that "we cannot distinguish [parole and probation revoca-
tion] proceedings in principle insofar as the demands of due process are concerned."
Id.
Significantly, the court also held that a probationer should be entitled to be repre-
sented by counsel. Id. at 461, 503 P.2d at 1321, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 313. While acknowl-
edging that the Morrissey decision did not compel such a result in parole revocation
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RETROACTIVITY
Chief Justice Burger stated that "[t]he few basic requirements set
out above . . . are applicable to future revocations of parole ... 23
His use of "future" is significant in that it suggests that the procedural
requirements defined in Morrissey were intended to have prospective
rather than retroactive effect.
The retroactivity of a rule is not automatically determined by the
provision of the Constitution on which it is based.238 Instead, as the
Court stated in Johnson v. New Jersey:
239
Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct
functions, its own background of precedent, and its own impact on the
administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine
must inevitably vary with the dictate involved.240
In Linkletter v. Walker,241 the Court stated that "the accepted rule
today is that in appropriate cases the Court may in the interest of jus-
tice make the rule prospective. '24 2  Therefore, the Court functions to
limit the retroactive application of judicially interpreted constitutional
rules. In Stovall v. Denno,24 3 the Court delineated the relevant con-
siderations in exercising this limiting function:
(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of
proceedings, the court asserted:
T]he efficient administration of justice requires that the defendant be assisted
by retained or appointed counsel . . . . Id. (emphasis added).
Notwithstanding the Vickers court's reliance on Morrissey to inject equivalent pro-
cedure into probation revocations, the court denied relief to the petitioner holding that
Morrissey was not intended to be applied retroactively:
Defendant in the instant case is not entitled to the benefits provided by Morris-
sey for the reason that Morrissey itself states that such procedures "are applicable
to future revocations .... " Id. at 462, 503 P.2d at 1321, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 313
citation omitted).
See People v. Nelson, 8 Cal.3d 463, 503 P.2d 1322, 105 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1972).
237. 408 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added). See note 236 supra.
238. E.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967) (Court denied retroactivity
to United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.
263 (1967)); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728 (1966) (Court denied retro-
active application of its decisions in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
239. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
240. Id. at 728.
241. 381 U.S. 618, 639-40 (1965) (Court denied retroactivity to Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961)).
242. 381 U.S. at 628. For a critical discussion of Linkletter, see Mishkin, Foreword:
The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HRv.
L. REy. 56 (1965).
243. 388 U.S. 293 (1967); see Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-39 (1965);
Comment, Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Application of Linkletter,
16 J. PuB. L. 193 (1967).
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the reliance by the law enforcement authorities on the old standards,
and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive ap-
plication of the new standards.
244
An attempt to systematically apply these limiting factors, however, re-
quires a determination of whether or not each factor should be given
equal weight in the balancing process.
245
Generally, those rules of criminal procedure which are fashioned to
correct serious flaws in the fact-finding process at trial have been given
retroactive effect.246  For example, in McConnell v. Rhay,247 which
held Mempa v. Rhay24s to be retroactive, the petitioner had been con-
victed of grand larceny and placed on probation for five years upon
condition that he serve one year in county jail.2 49 After two hearings his
probation was revoked. At neither hearing was he allowed counsel nor
was he advised of his right to have counsel appointed. 250  The Washing-
ton Supreme Court found that his Sixth Amendment rights had been
violated, but denied relief, holding that Mempa should not be applied to
cases in which probation and deferral or suspension of sentences had
been revoked prior to the date of that decision. 25" The Supreme Court
reversed, reasoning that the right to counsel at sentencing was no different
than other rights which had been applied retroactively (e.g., right to
counsel at trial, at certain arraignments and on appeal) and must be
treated the same.252 The Court said that "'[t]he necessity for the aid
of counsel in marshaling the facts, introducing evidence of mitigating
circumstances and in general aiding and assisting the defendant to
present his case as to sentence is apparent.' ",253 In short, the right to
counsel relates to "the very integrity of the fact finding process. ' 25 4
The peculiar aspect of McConnell is that, once it was determined
that the rule expounded in Mempa was fashioned to correct flaws in the
244. 388 U.S. at 297.
245. See Comment, Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Application
of Linkletter, 16 J. PuB. L. 193, 209-10 (1967). The author distinguishes three
possibilities for applying the three factors: balancing, determination solely on
the basis of purpose, and limited balancing. The latter two, however, are merely vari-
ations of balancing with emphasis placed on different factors. Consequently, such a
distinction would serve no purpose in this discussion.
246. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298 (1967).
247. 393 U.S. 2 (1968).
248. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
249. 393 U.S, 2 (1968).
250. Id. at 3.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 3-4.
253. Id. at 4, quoting Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 135 (1967).
254. Id, at 3, quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965).
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fact-finding process, retroactive effect was granted without any
further discussion of the other two limiting factors defined in Stovall.
This indicates the possiblity that, once the purpose of the rule is estab-
lished to be the protection of the fundamental fairness of the fact-deter-
mining process, retroactive effect can be granted without the necessity
of considering the other two limiting factors. 255
In cases where retroactive effect is denied, however, all three
factors are considered. 256  For example, the question involved in
Linkletter'57 was whether or not the decision in Mapp v. Ohio25s apply-
ing the exclusionary rule to the states should receive retroactive effect.
The Court concluded that "Mapp had as its prime purpose the enforce-
ment of the Fourth Amendment through the inclusion of the exclusionary
rule within its rights. '259  Consequently, deterrence of illegal police
action and not the prevention of error at trial was its purpose. Since
the governmental misconduct had already occurred in situations occur-
ring prior to the decision, retrospective application would serve no
purpose. Rather than immediately deny retroactive application as in
McConnell, however, the Court proceeded to analyze the factors of
reliance and impact on the administration of justice.260 Only upon a
determination that the states relied upon the pre-Mapp rule and that
applying Mapp retrospectively "would tax the administration of justice
to the utmost," did the Court restrict the Mapp decision to prospective
application.261
The test which emerges is that if the purpose of the rule under con-
sideration is to enhance the integrity of the fact-finding process, then
the rule will be held retroactive. 262 If the purpose of the rule is other-
wise, it can still be applied retroactively if it neither overburdens the
administration of justice nor was relied upon to any great extent. If the
rule is not intended to enhance the integrity of the fact-finding process,
however, and if the prior law had been substantially relied upon
255. Comment, Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Application of
Linkletter, 16 J. PuB. L. 193, 209 (1967).
256. See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 727, 731-32 (1966); Tehan v. Shot,
382 U.S. 406, 415-18 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-39 (1965).
257. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
258. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Court required exclusion of evidence seized in vio-
lation of the search and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment in state crimi-
nal trials).
259. 381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965).
260. Id. at 637.
261. Id.
262. See Comment, Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Application
of Linkletter, 16 J. PuB. L. 193, 211-12 (1967).
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and retroactive application of the rule would burden the administration
of justice, then the rule should be applied prospectively only.
The application of this test to Morrissey, contrary to the implication
of the Chief Justice, indicates that it should not be limited to prospec-
tive application. While parole revocation is not considered to be
part of a criminal trial, the determination of whether a parolee is guilty
of violating conditions of his parole is certainly a fact-finding or fact-
determining procedure. Chief Justice Burger indicated that the rule
expounded in Morrissey is primarily designed to enhance the reliability
of the fact-finding process in revocation hearings and only incidentally
to prevent administrative misconduct. 2 - Error rather than abuse is its
target, and thus, based on the "purpose test" defined in Stovall retro-
active effect should be granted.264
An analogous situation can be found in the Supreme Court's treatment
of Mempa v. Rhay2 5 in McConnell. The effect and purpose of the
holding in Morrissey is difficult to distinguish from the ruling in Mem-
263. 408 U.S. at 484. The argument for retroactivity suffers when the sole purpose
is to deter administrative officers from intentionally acting arbitrarily and without sub-
stantial evidence. Chief Justice Burger stated:
Society . . . has an interest in not having parole revoked because of erroneous
information or because of an erroneous evaluation of the need to revoke parole.
.. 408 U.S. at 484.
He does not imply that the purpose is to prevent intentional misuse of discre-
tion. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), which denied retro-
active effect to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), because the purpose of the search
and seizure exclusionary rule was to deter law officers from making unlawful searches
and seizures and it obviously would not have deterred those who had already acted.
See also L. HALL, Y. KAmISAR, W. LAFAvE, J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMHNAL PROCEDURE
592 (3d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as HALL].
264. Although a determination that the Morrissey rule was designed to enhance the
fact-finding process apparently negates the necessity of complying with the other two
considerations, it might be noted that an examination of the reliance and impact factors
would oppose retroactivity. It must be very clear that the reliance on the old standards
was complete and as varied as the standards themselves. 408 U.S. at 488 n.15. If the
reliance of those states which did not require hearings or otherwise did not adhere to
the Morrissey dictates are to be a consideration, then retroactivity should not be granted.
Further, the granting of retroactivity would allow many convicts to challenge their
parole revocations which could create a burden on the court system. This would
oppose retrospective application.
Chief Justice Burger stated that the Morrissey requirements "should not impose a
great burden on any State's parole system." Id. at 490. This statement seems to contra-
dict the argument against retroactivity in that it appears to indicate that no burden would
be created. A distinction must be drawn, however, between a burden on the court
system by retroactive application, which the Stovall test refers to, and a burden on
the parole system by prospective application. The Chief Justice is not referring to
the former, but is stating that no burden will be imposed on the parole system by a
prospective application of Morrissey. Id. As such, there is no inconsistency.
265. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
NOTES
pa.26 The factual pattern is even closer to McConnell which granted
retroactive application to Mempa. The probationer in McConnell
was released after serving a year in jail pursuant to a procedure classified
as probation. The distinction between such a procedure and parole is
nominal except for the tenuous argument that on revocation the petitioner
faced further sentencing rather than merely returning for the remainder
of a sentence already rendered.
267
Regardless of the McConnell analogy and the test defined by Link-
letter, the Chief Justice purports to have limited Morrissey to prospec-
tive application. Consistency requires that McConnell be distinguished,
that the purpose of the Morrissey decision be interpreted as something
other than ensuring fairness in the fact-finding process, or that the test
previously advanced be discarded. Although the latter alternative is
not inconceivable, the overruling of a previous case requires a com-
pelling necessity which is not apparent in Morrissey."" McConnell
could be distinguished from Morrissey on the basis that it involved
probation and Mdrrissey does not go to the integrity of the fact-deter-
mining process in a criminal proceeding. This distinction, however,
would stand or fall with the tenuous distinction between probation and
parole discussed earlier.
269
The most subtle and perhaps the most controversial approach would
be a simple molding of the purpose of Morrissey such that the tech-
nique utilized in Linkletter could be applied. A clue to such a method
is presented in Stovall itself. In that case, the Court applied all three
of the factors outlined therein. It argued that the extent to which a
condemned practice affects the integrity of the truth-determining proc-
ess is a question of probabilities.2 1 0  The Court recognized that, while
266. Id. Although Mempa dealt with probation rather than parole, it is analogous to
Morrissey. Both involved the constitutional rights of a convicted felon. Although
Mempa included the right to counsel and Morrissey did not, both had the effect and
purpose of establishing the minimum requirements of due process in their respective
revocation proceedings.
267. 408 U.S. at 480. In a state which provides for indeterminant sentencing, this
distinction dissolves. A parolee, although already sentenced, usually has his sentence
reset at the maximum while the probationer who has not been sentenced or whose
sentence has been suspended is subject to further sentencing which could result in
the maximum. See notes 70-82 supra and accompanying text.
268. Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which overruled Betts
v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), because a trial and conviction without the assistance of
counsel is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and, consequently, the right of an
indigent to have appointed counsel in a criminal trial is a fundamental right essential to
a fair trial.
269. See notes 70-86 supra and accompanying text.
270. 388 U.S. 293, 298 (1966).
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"the exclusionary rules set forth in Wade and Gilbert are justified
by the need to assure the integrity and reliability of our system of justice,
they undoubtedly will affect cases in which no unfairness will be
present.'71  Further, it remained open to anyone to allege and prove
that the confrontation (lineup) resulted in such unfairness that it in-
fringed his right to due process of law. 72 Ostensibly, the Stovall Court
concluded that the existence of this alternative remedy coupled with the
possibility of challenge to many prior fair confrontations indicated that
the dominant purpose of the Wade and Gilbert decisions was not directed
at ensuring the integrity of the fact-finding process. Although it was not
explicitly stated, the Court must have considered the deterrence of sug-
gestive identification procedures to be the prevailing purpose. Accord-
ingly, the Court proceeded to a consideration of reliance and impact
and, based on its evaluation of those factors, determined that retroactive
effect should be denied. 3
The application to Morrissey would be similar. While the rule under
consideration purports to enhance the truth-determination process, it
would be argued that many fair parole revocations would also be af-
fected. In addition, habeas corpus proceedings represent a means by
which a subsequent incarceration could be challenged regardless of the
limitations on Morrissey.7 4  Consequently, while the protections ad-
vanced in Morrissey affect the fact-finding process, the dominant pur-
pose must in fact be the deterrence of parole authorities from acting
capriciously and arbitrarily. Having surmounted the first obstacle, the
Court would then be at liberty to weigh the considerations of reliance
and impact and, in light of the implication that they would not support
retroactivity,17 5 Morrissey could be limited to prospective application.
Even if retroactivity is not granted, the question still remains as to
where the cut-off point will be. Not all decisions which are denied
retroactive effect have been applied only to prosecutions brought after
the date of the decision. 7 6  Thus, whether a denial of retroactivity
would mean Morrissey only applies to revocation proceedings taking
place after the decision, or whether it applies to cases pending review,
271. Id. at 299.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 299-301.
274. See note 242 supra.
275. See note 264 supra.
276. In Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), both Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966) and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), were held to
affect only those cases in which the trial began after the date of the respective deci-
sions. See HALL, supra note 263, at 593.
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would have to be decided. A strict interpretation of "future" would
render Morrissey applicable only to revocation proceedings taking place
after the decision. If a number of justices favored retroactivity, how-
ever, the broader interpretation could be adopted as a compromise and
it would also be applied to cases pending appeal at the time of the
decision.
CONCLUSION
The decision in Morrissey v. Brewer 77 is a significant step in parole
reform. It defines for the first time the minimum demands of due
process required by the United States Constitution at parole revocation
hearings, while maintaining the informality necessary to prevent a costly
and timely revocation procedure. The failure to specifically include the
right to counsel in the required procedure, however, may substantially
reduce its effectiveness. This issue will arise again, however. Con-
sidering the precedent at hand, it seems likely that the right to counsel
will eventually be added to the Morrissey formula. If it is, it will
complete the formula for an effective revocation proceeding which
could be the catalyst for parole reform on all levels.
Under the Morrissey formula, the function of parole as a means of
rehabilitation could receive a complete reevaluation. Technical condi-
tions of parole will receive an in-depth evaluation with each case. The
desired result would be a change in such conditions with a goal of
simplification and uniformity. This could create a viable behavorial
code by which parolees could rehabilitate themselves under the guid-
ance of their parole officers rather than become subject to common-
place revocation due to vague and unreasonable restrictions. It has
been said that the failure of the parolee is the failure of the parole
officer.278 This can be extended one step further to include the failure
of the parole system. With a more simplified and specific group of parole
conditions parolees will be able to make the transition from prisoner
to productive citizen because they will better understand their respon-
sibilities to society and to themselves. There is much to be done in the
way of parole reform and the judicial system cannot do it all. It can,
however, insure that individual rights and liberties are protected in this
area of the law. The parolee, the system and, most of all, the community
will benefit by such a change.
Michael C. Denison
277. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
278. 408 U.S. at 485-86, citing Note, Observations on the Administration of Parole,
79 YALE L.J. 698, 704-06 (1970).
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